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Germany is known to have one of the lowest fertility rates among Western European 
countries and also relatively low employment rates of mothers with young children. Although 
these trends have been observed during the last decades, the German public has only recently 
begun discussing these issues. In order to reverse these trends, the German government 
recently passed a reform of the parental leave benefit system in line with the Scandinavian 
model. The core piece of the reform is the replacement of the existing means-tested parental 
leave benefit by a wage-dependent benefit for the period of one year. In this paper we 
simulate fiscal costs and expected labour market outcomes of this reform. Based on a micro-
simulation model for Germany we calculate first-round effects, which assume no behavioural 
changes and second-round effects, where we take labour supply changes into account. Our 
results show that on average all income groups, couples and single households, benefit from 
the reform. The calculation of overall costs of the reform shows that the additional costs are 
moderate. As far as the labour market behaviour of parents is concerned, we find no 
significant changes of labour market outcomes in the first year after birth. However, in the 
second year, mothers increase their working hours and labour market participation 
significantly. Our results suggest that the reform will achieve one of its aims, namely the 
increase in the labour market participation of mothers with young children.  
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1 Introduction   
Labour force participation of mothers with very young children is low in Germany, especially 
in comparison with other Western European countries. The employment rate for mothers with 
children under three years of age is 48% in Germany compared, for example, to 77% in 
Sweden (e.g. OECD 2006). These rates have been relatively constant for many years, but 
public discussion of this issue in Germany is a new phenomenon. Politicians today explicitly 
state the aim of increasing the labour force participation of mothers with young children1 and 
to this end, of increasing their return-to-work rates. Similar observations can be made 
regarding the low fertility rate: in 2004, Germany as a whole had a 1.34 fertility rate 
compared to much higher rates in Sweden and France of 1.76 and 1.92, respectively (Hoem 
2005). The widespread public discussion of this issue is new as well; and here too, German 
policymakers are beginning to explicitly state the aim of increasing fertility (see several 
publications by the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, e.g. BMFSFJ 2005).  
In these public discussions, experts and politicians explicitly take the Scandinavian countries 
as a role model. These countries have high employment rates for mothers with young children 
and among the highest fertility rates in Europe. Given these empirical facts, the German 
debate is dominated by the belief that Scandinavian family policies, which provide a high 
supply of public-financed day care for children and a generous parental leave system are 
major factors contributing to the higher employment rates of mothers with young children and 
higher fertility rates there. As far as parental leave is concerned, it is argued in particular that 
a one-year wage-dependent benefit – which has been granted in the Scandinavian countries 
for several years – increases the return-to-work rate of mothers with young children and boots 
fertility rates by reducing income losses for families immediately after childbirth.  
These topics have been assigned such high priority in German social policy that the proposal 
for a wage-dependent parental leave benefit as found in the Scandinavian countries emerged 
as a major topic in the last election campaign. After lengthy public debate, German parliament 
voted in September 2006 that this benefit would be instituted beginning in January 2007. 
                                                 
1 See the homepage of the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, http://www.bmfsfj.de/Politikbereiche/Familie/familie-




Apart from a rise in the employment rate of mothers with young children in Germany and an 
increase in the German fertility rate, the reform also has other major goals that it intends to 
reach using a Scandinavian model although some of these are linked to those mentioned 
above. One is to increase the income of families with small children in a crucial phase of 
bonding between new parents and child. Here the objective is to provide compensation to 
middle- and high-income parents, who experience a relatively high-income loss due to a 
birth-related employment break. Furthermore, the reform is intended to increase the 
percentage of fathers who assume care responsibilities and should thus promote equality of 
opportunity between women and men. In combination with various efforts on the federal and 
state levels to increase the supply of publicly funded day care, this reform should help parents 
generally in combining family responsibilities and employment.  
Against this background, the objective of the present paper is to estimate potential 
implications of the current parental leave reform proposal using a micro-simulation model. 
We focus on two major aspects: first, the additional public costs of such a reform. Our 
calculation of these costs is of particular interest, as the German debate on this reform has 
been dominated thus far by financial concerns that the reform would be too costly. Second, 
we estimate potential labour supply effects of this reform for mothers and fathers.   
Before we describe our data set and the methodological approach in more detail, we first give 
a brief overview of the current parental leave policy and the proposed changes, comparing 
them against the Scandinavian model. We discuss previous research on parental leave issues 
that is comparable with our analysis; thus we concentrate on empirical studies based on 
representative data stets. In chapter four we summarize our empirical strategy and describe 
our data. Finally, in chapter five, we present and discuss our results, and end by outlining our 
conclusions.2  
                                                 
2 For a more detailed description of the empirical strategy and the simulation results of other reform alternatives 
as well, see Büchner et al. (2006). Discussion Papers   630 
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2  Is Germany Moving towards the Scandinavian Model?  
Maternal and parental leave policies in the Scandinavian countries have a long history starting 
at the beginning of the last century. Although there are differences between the Scandinavian 
countries (see e.g. Datta Gupta, Smith, and Verner 2006) all these countries share major 
characteristics. The main feature of the “Scandinavian model” is a leave period of about one 
year and a father quota, which reserves a specific time period for fathers to stay home with 
children. Denmark is the only Scandinavian country to have abolished the father quota, which 
it did in 2002. The compensation rates during maternity and parental leave range from an 
average compensation rate of about 66% of former wages in Denmark, to a maximum in 
Sweden, Iceland and Norway of 80%. Another common characteristic is the flexibility of 
leave schemes, some of which allow part-time leave over a longer period instead of full-time 
leave in a shorter period. Sweden has the most flexible scheme; while those in Denmark and 
Finland are less flexible (see e.g. Datta Gupta, Smith, and Verner 2006, and Duvander, 
Ferrarini, and Thalberg 2005).  
What does the current German parental leave policy look like and what major changes would 
the proposed reform entail? The overall model for the current German parental leave and 
benefit policy is the “breadwinner model”, which assumes that one parent, usually the mother, 
stays home, and that the other, usually the father, is the breadwinner for the family (e.g. 
BMFSFJ 2006a). This is a substantial difference from the Scandinavian countries, where the 
policies are embedded in the “dual-earner household model”. However, in Germany it is 
becoming more and more socially acceptable and desirable for women with younger children 
to work as well. Today, the existing model can be described as the “one-and-a-half-earner 
model”, where the father usually works full-time and the mother part-time.  
Overall the German child-rearing benefit law entitles all mothers or fathers to job protection 
while being on parental leave3. The parent who stays at home is provided with a child-rearing 
benefit, regardless of whether or not this parent worked previously. This benefit is means-
tested at the household level. Parents can go on parental leave (“Elternzeit”) for a maximum 
                                                 
3 Currently, parental leave and benefits are regulated in the child-rearing benefit law (“Bundeserziehungs-
geldgesetz”). In addition, there is a special law, the mother protection law (“Mutterschutzgesetz”) regulating job-Discussion Papers   630 
2 Is Germany Moving towards the Scandinavian Model? 
 
5
of three years. Compared to the Scandinavian countries, this is a relatively long period. 
During this period, the parent enjoys job protection. The father and the mother may go on 
leave consecutively or simultaneously. The child-rearing benefit, however, is not granted for 
the whole period of protected parental leave. So far the eligibility period for the child-rearing 
benefit ends at the child’s second birthday. All parents who do not work full-time, defined as 
up to 30 hours per week, are eligible for this benefit up to a maximum of 300 euros per 
month. The child-rearing benefit is means-tested on the household level with two different 
income thresholds. In the first six months after the child’s birth, the income thresholds up to 
which the benefit is paid are more generous than for the next 18 months. The child-rearing 
benefit is tax-free and does not reduce the entitlement to social assistance.  
The basic approach of the current reform is to replace the existing means-tested child-rearing 
benefit (“Erziehungsgeld”) with a parental leave benefit (“Elterngeld”) that replaces 67% of 
net earnings for a stay-at-home parent in the first year after birth.4 This implies a substantial 
move towards the Scandinavian model. The maximum benefit will amount to 1,800 euros per 
month and the minimum to 300 euros per month, the latter intended for low-income parents 
who did not work before the birth of their child. Furthermore, low-income families with net 
income less than 1,000 euros per month receive a higher parental leave benefit: for every 20 
euros below this income threshold, the replacement rate is increased by 1%. The new parental 
leave benefit will be granted for 14 months as compared to the existing child-rearing benefit, 
which is granted for two years.5 Again, this is a step towards Scandinavian policies. In fact, 
the parental benefit will only be granted for 14 months if the two parents share the parental 
leave: the maximum duration for each parent is 12 months and the joint duration is 14 
months. This “father quota” has been widely criticized in the German discussion on the 
reform proposal. Opponents argue that a father quota constitutes too much intervention into 
parents’ private decisions on time allocation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
protection and wage-replacement during pregnancy. It also designates the mother protection period, which covers 
six weeks before and eight weeks after birth. 
4 For the current reform proposal, see BMFSFJ (2006b). 
5 However, parents do have the option to spread the total amount of the parent benefit over 24 instead of 12 
months.  Discussion Papers   630 
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There will be no working hours restriction on eligibility under the reform in contrast to the 
present scheme, which only provides benefits to parents who work less than 30 hours per 
week. However, since the benefit is designed to replace foregone earnings due to child 
rearing, it is decreased according to working hours. While the full amount of the benefit is 
paid to parents who do not work at all, parents who reduce pre-birth working hours by 50% 
receive half of the benefit. Parents can also share the benefit, e.g. the two parents can work 
part-time and each then receives half of the benefit. However the benefit is calculated 
covering no more than 40 working hours per week. This implies that it is impossible for both 
parents to stop working completely and receive the full benefit. In contrast to the current 
child-rearing benefit, which is granted in addition to social assistance, the parent’s benefit 
will be counted as income within the social assistance scheme. If a second child is born in the 
time frame of 36 months, a “speed premium” is paid, which is one element of the parental 
leave policy in Sweden as well (see, Duvander, Ferrarini, and Thalbergh 2005).  
3  Previous Research on the Effects of Parental Leave 
Regulations  
There is a relatively broad literature studying the effect of parental leave policies. While there 
is a relatively extensive literature on labour market outcomes and the return-to-work decision 
of young mothers, fewer studies exist on the direct link of this to fertility (e.g., Hoem, 
Prskawetz, and Neyer 2001 and Büttner and Lutz 1990) and very few studies that focus on 
gender equality and other issues (see, Ekberg, Eriksson, and Friebel 2005 and Brunning and 
Plantenga 1999). 
Among the studies that focus on labour market outcomes, a first group of papers is based on 
US data. Given the very different institutional setting in respect to family policy and in 
particular to parental leave policy, these studies should be interpreted carefully in a European 
context. The empirical evidence concerning the relationship between parental leave policies 
in the US and labour market outcomes is mixed. Some studies (see, e.g. Klerman and 
Leibowitz 1997, 1999, and Baum 2003) do not find a significant relationship, while others 
find that there is a significant relationship between maternity leave coverage and mothers’ 
labour force participation – for example, Berger and Waldfogel (2004), Waldfogel (1998), Discussion Papers   630 
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Hashimoto, Percy, Schoellner and Weinberg (2004), and the international comparative study 
by Waldfogel, Higuchi, and Abe (1999).  
There are two groups of studies with a European focus: one group using macro data and a 
second using micro data. The studies by Ruhm (1998) and Ruhm and Teague (1997) are 
examples from the first group of studies. They show that women’s attachment to the labour 
force increases with the duration of parental leave benefits. The study by Datta Gupta, Smith, 
and Verner (2006) focuses on the question of whether the Nordic Model should be aspired to. 
On the macro-level they look at female labour force participation rates and other outcomes. 
They find mixed results in comparison to other countries with a less family-friendly policy. 
An important study from the second group using micro data is the Swedish-Danish 
comparison by Pylkkänen and Smith (2004). They show that the impact of parental leave and 
other family policies has a strong impact on mothers’ career interruptions in both of these 
countries. Rönsen and Sundström (1996) study the employment activity of young mothers in 
Norway and Sweden. They find that the right to paid maternity leave with job protection 
greatly speeds up the return to employment, and that women who have this right are much 
more likely to resume employment. Extensions of leave schemes and the so-called Swedish 
“speed-premium” on the next birth have delayed the return to work, however. The empirical 
study from Denmark and Sweden by Albrecht, Edin, Sundström, and Vroman  (1999) finds 
very small long-run effects on subsequent earnings for mothers who entered formal maternity 
leave. Lalive and Zweimüller (2005) study the effect of the Austrian Parental Leave reform 
on return-to-work and fertility based on social security data. They find a strong effect of 
parental leave rules on mothers’ return-to-work behaviour. For each additional month of 
maximum parental leave duration, mothers’ time off work is reduced by 0.4 to 0.5 months. 
Gutierrez-Domenech (2005) investigates transitions from employment to no employment 
after motherhood in five European countries (Belgium, West Germany, Italy, Spain and 
Sweden) using data from the Family and Fertility Survey. The paper includes a special section 
on the evaluation of the different relevant policies such as maternity leave. Her results show 
that the variable for maternity leave does not have a significant impact on the evolution of 
post-birth employment.6  
                                                 
6 Other micro-data based studies focus on the effect of overall differences in family policies of various countries 
on mothers’ returns to work. See Gutstafsson, Wetzels, Vlasblom and Dex  (1996) as one example. Discussion Papers   630 
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Empirical studies focusing on Germany deal with the role of parental leave policies to labour 
market outcomes as well. Several studies by Ondrich, Spiess, Wagner, and Yang, based on 
the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP), show that various parental leave policies 
in Germany observed since the early eighties affect mothers’ returns to employment. An 
initial study by Ondrich, Spiess, and Yang (1996) shows that mothers on parental leave are 
less likely to return to work the longer the time remaining in the leave protection period – a 
result that cannot, however, be attributed generally to high levels of maternity benefits. 
Ondrich, Spiess, Wagner, and Yang (1999) show that changes in maximum leave durations in 
1980s had a significant effect on the time that mothers spent with their child. The subsequent 
paper by Ondrich, Spiess, Wagner, and Yang (2003) demonstrates that the increases in 
parental leave duration are consistent with the hypothesis that employment conditions or 
career expectations frequently change for mothers taking longer leaves. Ondrich, Spiess, and 
Yang (2003) show that taking leave negatively affects wage growth in both periods of 
parental leave policy regimes defined in the paper. Estimates imply that each month of 
maternity leave reduced wage growth by 1.5% over five years. Another paper based on the 
GSOEP data by Weber (2004) also shows that the extension of parental leave and an increase 
in the benefit resulted in a lower return-to-work rate of mothers with young children in 
Germany. 
4  Empirical Strategy and Data 
In order to assess the effects of the parental leave reform in Germany described in Section 2 
in terms of fiscal costs and work incentives, we use a behavioural micro-simulation model. 
The advantage of using micro-simulation models for policy assessment is that they make it 
possible to make evaluations from ex-ante perspective. In particular, these models can be used 
to calculate “first-round” effects, i.e., effects that the reform has on net household incomes or 
– on the aggregate level – on fiscal costs, before households react to the reform and change 
their employment behaviour. Using an empirically estimated behavioural model of labour 
supply, the “second-round” effects can be estimated, i.e., the behavioural changes that result 
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from the reform and how these changes affect income tax revenues and social security 
contributions. 
Behavioural micro-simulation models consist of three parts. First, a representative micro data 
set is needed that contains all relevant information on household structure, income from 
different sources, working hours, and socio-demographic characteristics. The second part 
consists of a tax-benefit calculator that computes net household incomes for each household 
in the data set on the basis of information on gross incomes. With this calculator, it is possible 
to compute net household incomes not only under the current legislation but also for different 
hypothetical laws. In particular, it is possible to compare actual net household incomes to 
those that would result from such policy reforms as a change of the parental leave benefit 
scheme. Finally, the micro-simulation model contains a behavioural model – in our case, a 
model of parental labour supply.  
For the analysis of the effects of the parental leave reform in Germany we employ the micro-
simulation model STSM (“Steuer- und Transfersimulationsmodell”).7 This model is based on 
data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP). The GSOEP is a representative 
sample of private households living in Germany. It provides information on all household 
members.8 For our analysis we pool three consecutive waves of the GSOEP, 2001 to 2003. 
We do so to attain a large enough sample for our estimations. In each year, we only take 
households with at least one child aged less than 24 months. This leaves us with a sample of 
995 households. On average, 57% of mothers in two-parent families and 49% of single 
mothers were working prior the birth of their child. Three months after birth, the labour 
market participation rates of mothers were 13%. Further descriptive statistics can be found in 
the Appendix. 
The model of parental labour supply we use is based on a standard household utility model, 
where it is assumed that utility depends on household income and leisure of the adult family 
members. A detailed description and motivation of the econometrics of the behavioural model 
is given in Steiner and Wrohlich (2004 and 2006). Our estimation of the parameters of the 
utility function is based on a discrete choice model of 11 choice categories, such as father 
                                                 
7 For more details on the STSM, see Steiner et al. (2005).  




working full-time, non-working mother, both parents working part-time, etc. For a description 
of these categories and more information about the estimations, see the Appendix. The 
underlying assumption is that households compare the utility of different combinations of 
working hours and net household incomes and choose the combination that yields the highest 
utility. The net household incomes in the different working hour categories are calculated 
using the tax-benefit calculator mentioned above. After estimation of the behavioural model, 
the parameters of the utility function are used for the prediction of the behavioural changes 
that result due to the income changes implied by the reform. The Appendix includes tables 
summarizing the descriptive statistics and the estimation results. 
Due to data limitations and restrictions in the model, we were not able to simulate every detail 
of the current reform proposal.9 Nevertheless, all substantial changes, such as a shorter period 
of wage benefits, could be taken into account. 
5 Results 
Results of the first-round effects. In a first step, we use the tax-benefit calculator to compute 
the income changes due to the parental leave reform for all families with at least one child 
less than 12 months. This sample consists of 762 households, of which 710 are two-parent 
families and 52 are single-parent families. We restrict the sample to these 762 families, as 
they are the relevant group who will potentially benefit from the reform. No simulations are 
needed to learn that parents with older children who are on parental leave in the second year 
of a child’s life will either experience no changes, because they were not eligible for a benefit 
anyway, or they will loose, because the benefit is no longer paid. This is a consequence of the 
attempt to increase the incentives to work. 
Table 1 shows the changes due to the benefit reform for different family types and for 
families in different income groups. The second column shows the absolute amount of the 
expected benefit, which ranges between 390 euros per month in the lowest income quartile up 
to 571 euros in the highest income quartile. The third column of the table shows that on 
average, the monthly income gain for families with a child younger than 12 months is higher 
                                                 




for couples than for single parents. On average, couples gain 84 euros more than single-parent 
households. As can also be seen from Table 1, the gains increase with net household income. 
The income gains for the fourth quartile of the income distribution are more than three times 
higher than those in the first income quartile. This is not surprising given that the new 
parental leave benefit is positively related to earnings before birth, while the existing scheme 
is a means-tested benefit of maximum 300 euros per month. However, the income gains not 
only increase with household income in absolute terms, but also in relative terms: In the top 
quartile, the income gains amount to 9% of net household income, while in the first quartile, 
the gains amounts to 6%. The percentage of winners from this reform (see last column of 
Table 1) is much higher among couples than among single households, which is due to the 
higher income of the former. In the first quartile, 42% of the households in the first quartile of 
the income distribution benefit from the reform, while in the top quartile, 88% of all 
households benefit; 10% of all households experience no change at all. Furthermore, a 
calculation of the loss of income resulting from the reform for the first quartile of the income 
distribution shows that the losses are moderate, on average around seven euros per month (not 
shown in Table 1).  
Table 1: Changes in net household income due to the reform 
  Mean net income 
before the reform 
(status quo) in 
euros per month 
Mean amount of 
the parental leave 
benefit after the 
reform in euros 
per month 
Mean income 
change due to the 





increasing due to 
the reform 
All two-parent 
families 3,182  464  246  73 
All single-parent 
families 1,767  413  162  42 
Households in the 
1
st  quartile* 1,732 390  117  42 
Households in the 
2
nd quartile  2,479  402  124  64 
Households in the 
3
rd quartile  3,173  472  256  87 
Households in the 
4
th quartile  4,799  571  455  88 
* Deciles are defined for all households with at least one child less than 12 months of age. Income is defined as net household 
income in the year when the child is born. 
Source: Own calculations based on GSOEP, waves 2001-2003, and STSM. 




An aggregation of the income changes for each household leads to the overall fiscal costs of 
the reform, amounting to about 3.5 billion euros per year. As a comparison, the costs for the 
current parental leave scheme amount to about 3 billion euros per year. Thus, the concern that 
the reform would lead to a marked increase in public expenditures seems unjustified. 
However, if people adjust their behaviour accordingly and in particular postpone childbirth 
until after an employment spell, the costs could rise. This effect has not been modelled so far. 
Results of the second-round effects. The results of the estimation of labour supply reactions 
due to the reform are summarised in Table 2. We do not find significant changes in labour 
supply of mothers with children less than one year of age. Fathers, however, show a small, but 
significant increase in working hours in this first year. Thus, the expectation of policy makers 
that the reform will result in an increasing number of fathers taking parental leave in the first 
year of the child’s life is not supported by our results. In contrast, fathers’ working hours 
would even increase slightly. This is due to the fact that the negative work incentive that 
results from the current means-tested parental leave benefit scheme is not present under the 
new scheme. Note, however, that the proposed father quota is not modelled.  Furthermore, the  
experience with the existing quotas tells us that on average, fathers do not extend their leave 
period beyond the allotted fatherhood months (Datta Gupta, Smith, and Verner 2006). Given 
these results, a substantial change in fathers’ working behaviour due to a father quota is not to 
be expected.  
Table 2: Changes in labour supply due to the reform 
  Mothers (m)  Fathers (f) 
  Change in Working Hours (in %) 
Families with youngest child < 12 months 
(Baselines: m 2.7 hours/week; f 36.5 hours/week) 
2.7 
(-7.9 – 2.5)* 
1.1 
(0.4 – 1.8)* 
Families with youngest child 12-24 months 
(Baselines: m 6.8 hours/week; f 38.7 hours/week) 
11.7 
(5.7 – 17.7)* 
2.0 
(1.1 – 2.9)* 
  Change in Participation Rates (in %-points) 
Families with youngest child < 12 months 
(Baselines: m 12%; f 89%) 
-0.3 
(-0.9 – 0.4)* 
0.4 
(0 – 0.7)* 
Families with youngest child 12-24 months 
(Baselines: m 36%; f 93%) 
3.3 
(1.8 – 4.7)* 
1.0 
(0.5 – 1.5)* 
* The 95% confidence interval (bootstrap method) is given in parentheses. 
Source: authors’ calculations based on GSOEP, waves 2001-2003 and STSM. 
For mothers whose youngest child is between 12 and 24 months old, however, we find a large 




increase working hours by almost 12% on average and their labour force participation rates 
increase by more than three percentage points. This result suggests that the reform will indeed 
contribute to reducing the relatively long employment interruptions of German mothers. For 
fathers, we also find a small increase in working hours and labour force participation. Clearly, 
the increased labour supply of parents in the second year after birth can be attributed to the 
reform’s abolition of disincentives to work existing under the means-tested parental leave 
benefit.  
The increased labour force participation and the increase in working hours in the second year 
after childbirth lead to an increase in income taxation and social security contributions. 
Assuming that all mothers found jobs paid at their pre-birth wages, we find that income taxes 
would rise by about 100 million euros per year, and employee social security contributions (to 
the old age pension scheme and health and unemployment insurance) would rise by the same 
amount. However, these additional revenues are not sufficient to make the reform self-
financing. 
6 Conclusions   
In this paper we estimate the fiscal costs and the expected labour market outcomes of the 
current German parental leave reform proposal. The results of the first-round effects show 
that on average, couples and single parents in all income groups profit from the reform. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that high-income households benefit more than low-income 
households from the replacement of a means-tested benefit with a wage-dependent benefit, 
both in absolute and relative terms. Overall, couples benefit more from the reform than 
singles. The estimated costs of the reform show that it is not as costly as has been asserted in 
the public debate. Thus, the overall costs of the reform as a whole, in comparison to the 
current benefit system, provide no argument against it.  
The results of the second-round effect show that the reform will not change the labour market 
participation of mothers in their child’s first year of life. For fathers, no substantial changes 
are expected either. However, in the second year of a child’s life, the reform will induce a 
12% increase in the working hours of mothers. The participation rate will increase from 36% 




the second year are small. The reform aims to increase the labour market participation of 
mothers with young children, and our simulation results show that this objective can be 
reached. Compared to other policy reforms, such as decreasing parents' fees for child care 
facilities or a change of the German income tax system to include family tax splitting, the 
labour supply effect induced by the current parental leave reform is quite large (see for a 
simulation of the other policy changes, Wrohlich 2006b and Steiner and Wrohlich 2006). 
Increasing the availability of subsidized childcare facilities for children less than three years 
with working mothers, however, has been shown to lead to an effect of similar size (Wrohlich 
2006b). Apart from this, the increase in mothers’ labour force participation leads to an 
increase in income taxes and social security contributions amounting to a total of about 200 
million euros per year.  
Our results provide evidence on effects of the reform addressing issues raised in the debate 
surrounding its development and introduction. First, the additional costs of the reform are 
moderate. Second, the minimum amount of 300 euros makes it possible to reduce the group of 
“losers” from the reform among low-income families, and most importantly, for the first 
quartile of the income distribution it results in a moderate income loss. In the German debate 
this was and still is an important issue, as some pressure groups have argued that the reform 
puts low-income households at a disadvantage relative to those higher up the income 
distribution.   
The success of the reform overall will of course depend on other issues as well. The reduction 
of the benefit period and the expected increase in the labour market participation of mothers 
with young children is not linked just to existing labour demand but also to the provision of 
childcare. If no formal and informal care substitutes are available, parents may be unable to 
work. With respect to formal childcare, in east Germany there currently exist numerous 
institutional alternatives to parental care. In 2005/2006 for every 100 children below the age 
of three, there existed 40 slots in childcare centres. The situation is very different in west 
Germany, where in 2005/2006 there were only about 10 slots per 100 children in the same age 
group (BMFSFJ 2006c). Informal care, for example by relatives, thus offers one of the few 
possibilities for mothers of young children to combine work and family. Nevertheless with 
increasing female labour force participation and an increasing distance between the 




be a realistic alternative for the majority of families (Büchel und Spiess 2002). The German 
government is aware of the fact that in the west, not enough day care is provided to combine 
work and family. Therefore the previous government already started various initiatives to 
improve the situation. But not much money is available for such improvements and at the 
moment, it is not clear whether such initiatives will substantially improve the situation in the 
short term (see Wrohlich 2006b). This will be necessary if the parental leave reform is to get 
off to a successful start in 2007.  
Apart from this, the success of such a reform with respect to a better combination of work and 
family duties, a more equal division of these tasks between men and women, and an increase 
in the German fertility rate cannot be judged solely by an evaluation of the parental leave 
reform itself. In the long run, it is the overall family policy mix that will explain broader 
social outcomes.  The Scandinavian countries in particular demonstrate that a coherent set of 
family policies is needed to reach goals like those currently under discussion. A change in the 
parental leave along the lines of the one proposed might be a step in the right direction. 
Nevertheless, this step must be an element of a broader set of policy changes covering such 
policies as an increase in the provision of publicly subsidized child care, changes in the tax 
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7 Appendix 
7 Appendix 
Formal description of the labour supply model, data and estimation procedure 
The labour supply model used for the estimation of the behavioural effects resulting from the 
parental leave benefit reform is a structural household utility model. Household utility is 
assumed to be a function of net household income, the leisure of the mother and the leisure of 
the father. The estimation of the utility function is based on a discrete choice model. The 
underlying assumption is that households compare the utility U of different choice categories 
k, i.e. combinations of working hours and net household incomes, and choose the 
combination, which yields the highest utility.10  
 
We follow van Soest (1995) and specify the household utility function as a trans-log function, 
i.e. 
() kk k k k k Ux x A x x β ε ′′ =+ +          ( 1 )  
where Uk is the utility of the household in choice category k and the vector x contains the 
linear, quadratic and cross terms of the natural logs of net income, leisure of the mother and 
leisure of the father. Matrix A contains the coefficients of the cross and quadratic terms, 
vector β contains the coefficients of the linear terms and ε is a stochastic error term.  
Assuming that households maximize utility, they choose category k if the utility in this choice 
category is greater than in all other categories. In probability terms, this decision rule can be 
stated as follows: 
() ( ) () k l l l l k k k l k x Ax x x Ax x P U U P ε ε β β − > + − + = > ' ' ' ' ) (        (2) 
Assuming that the error terms ε are independently and identically distributed over all choice 
categories and follow an extreme value distribution, the probability to choose category k as 
stated in equation (2) can be estimated using the conditional logit model (McFadden 1973): 
 
                                                 
10 A detailed description and motivation of the model, which follows the approach of van Soest (1995), is given in 
Steiner and Wrohlich (2004). 
 





















         ( 3 )  
In order to include individual or household specific characteristics, we also include 
interaction terms between these characteristics and leisure. These characteristics are age of 
the mother, age of the father, age of the youngest child, number of children and a dummy 
variable indicating whether the household is living in east Germany (see Table A.3). 
For the estimation of the labour supply model, we include two-parent families (either married 
or cohabiting couples) who have at least one child less than 24 months. We exclude single 
parents because it seems plausible that the parameters of their utility function would differ 
from those of two-parent families. Unfortunately, we do not have enough observations to 
estimate a separate regression for single parents, who make up about 10% of our sample. 
Thus, our results refer to two-parent families only. We further exclude households in which 
one of the parents is still in education, self-employed or severely disabled. As we pool 
observations from three periods (2001-2003), some households enter the sample in two 
periods. In our estimation, we assume that these observations are independent. 
Table A.1 shows the distribution of households in our sample for the estimation of the labour 
supply equation across choice categories. The definition of the hours categories is motivated 
by both economic considerations and the actual distribution of hours in the sample.  Although 
a relatively fine aggregation of hours into categories seems desirable in order to realistically 
approximate the household’s budget constraint, the actual distribution of hours in the sample 
severely restricts the number of possible categories.  Furthermore, for couples, the feasible 
number of categories is not only restricted by the distribution of hours within one gender, but 
by the bivariate distribution of the two spouses’ working hours. For example, we observe few 
men in our sample who are either not working or are working part-time. Thus, for these two 
working categories of men, we define only two working hours categories for women, non-
working and working.  
 




Table A.1: Sample size and distribution of households across choice categories 
choice 
category 
working  hours of the mother 
(average hours in brackets) 
working hours of the father 






1   non-working (0)  non-working (0)  70  7.04 
2  working (30)  non-working (0)  22  2.21 
3  non-working (0)  part-time (23)  14  1.41 
4  working (27)  part-time (22)  11  1.11 
5  non-working (0)  full-time (39)  391  39.30 
6  marginal employment (9)  full-time (39)  49  4.92 
7  part-time (21)  full-time (39)  47  4.72 
8  full-time or overtime (39)  full-time or overtime (43)  31  3.12 
9  non-working (0)  overtime (46)  284  28.54 
10  marginal (9)  overtime (46)  41  4.12 
11  part-time (22)  overtime (45)  35  3.52 
         
     995  100.00 
Source: Own calculations based on GSOEP, waves 2001-2003. 
 
Table A.2 presents further descriptive characteristics such as net household income, age of the 
parents and number of children in each hours category. 
 









children less than 
12 months 
age of the 
mother 
age of the 
father 
1   1701  1.97  0.69  28.9  31.9 
2 2195  1.86  0.41  31.6  34.8 
3 2922  1.57  0.57  34.6  39.6 
4 2989  1.46  0.27  34.9  37.6 
5 2729  1.84  0.62  31.0  33.6 
6 2866  1.65  0.14  31.6  34.7 
7 3451  1.43  0.23  31.9  34.4 
8 4361  1.90  0.36  33.4  36.1 
9 3258  1.93  0.52  32.1  34.5 
10 3368  1.56  0.20  32.0  34.4 
11 3408  1.60  0.23  32.6  35.3 
           
overall mean  2943  1.82  0.50 31.5  34.2
Source: Own calculations based on GSOEP, waves 2001-2003. 




The results of the labour supply estimations are presented in Table A.3. 
Table A.3: Coefficients of the conditional logit model 
 Coefficient Standard  Error 
net income  24.83 17.80 
net income squared  -0.46 0.77 
net income x leisure of the father  -1.29 0.93 
net income x leisure of the mother  -1.70 1.03 
leisure of the father  68.01 14.00 
leisure of the father squared  -2.08 0.66 
leisure of the mother  -70.25 18.05 
leisure of the mother squared  14.66 1.28 
leisure of the father  x leisure of the mother  -7.98 1.20 
leisure of the father x east  -3.03 6.91 
leisure of the mother x east  -5.32 6.19 
leisure of the father x leisure of the mother x east  0.58 1.62 
net income x east  -15.06 10.81 
net income squared x east  0.82 0.71 
net income x kid00  -2.60 0.98 
net income x 2kids  1.88 1.10 
net income x 3kids  3.17 1.30 
leisure of the father x age of the father  -0.44 0.22 
leisure of the father x age of the father squared  0.01 0.003 
leisure of the mother x age of the mother  0.07 0.43 
leisure of the mother x age of the mother squared  -0.003 0.01 
leisure of the mother x kid00  1.82 0.71 
leisure of the father x kid00  -0.20 0.53 
leisure of the mother x 2kids  0.48 0.70 
leisure of the mother x 3kids  3.07 1.02 
leisure of the father x 2kids  1.01 0.61 
Log Likelihood: -1788,3059 
LR chi2(27): 1194,61 
Prob > chi2: 0,000 
 
    
Note:  
x   denotes an interaction term 
east  household is living in east Germany  
kid00   is a dummy variable indicating that the youngest child is less than 1 year  
2kids   is a dummy variable indicating that there are 2 children living in the household  
3kids   is a dummy variable indicating that there are 3 or more children living in the household  
Source: Own estimations based on GSOEP, waves 2001-2003.  